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Abstract
If a given scientific community faces an epistemic harm that could be
prevented only by a collective action, what kind of epistemic duties fall on
each of the given scientists? In this paper we propose an account of collec-
tive epistemic responsibility, which addresses this and related questions.
Building on Hindriks’ (2018) account of collective moral responsibility, we
introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces as a norm consisting of two
sub-norms: first, a duty of individuals to approach other relevant agents
raising awareness about the epistemic harm, expressing willingness to pre-
vent it, and encouraging others to do the same; and second, a duty of those
who have expressed their commitment to join forces, to prevent the given
epistemic harm. We argue that our account has a distinctly epistemic
character, irreducible to the accounts of collective moral responsibility.
As such, it fills an important gap in the literature on epistemic responsi-
bility. In contrast to previous accounts of epistemic responsibility, which
have been concerned with the conditions of responsible belief formation
and holding, our approach concerns responsibility for other kinds of per-
formances, specifically those aimed at preventing epistemic harms.
1 Introduction
Consider the following two scenarios.
Abandoned-research. Imagine scientists working in a certain branch
of medicine, trying to find a cure for a certain disease. Since there are
two main hypotheses for what could be causing the disease, some sci-
entists are pursuing the line of inquiry based on hypothesis H1 while
others follow hypothesis H2. Due to a random course of events (such
as a number of scientists having retired from academic research, or
having moved on to a different research project due to personal ca-
reer goals) H1 is dropped. A few decades later it turns out that the
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abandoned hypothesis in fact offered the right track to finding the
cure for the disease, and the scientific community ended up side-
tracked on a sub-optimal line of inquiry for a long period of time.1
In such a case, who (if anyone) is to blame? Moreover, do contem-
porary scientists have any duties aimed at lowering the risk of a
premature abandonment of fruitful hypotheses?
Biased. There has been a growing body of evidence that some prac-
tices employed in a certain field of scientific research frequently fall
prey to various types of biases, lowering the overall reliability of
published results. If I am a scientist working in this field and aware
of the problem, yet I know that I can’t change the entrenched prac-
tices on my own, do I have any moral and epistemic duties to address
this problem? And conversely: if I fail to act towards resolving the
issue, am I morally and/or epistemically blameworthy for what is
happening?
Each of the above cases concerns a situation in which the given scientific com-
munity is facing a threat of epistemically harmful effects (or epistemic harms
for short). Moreover, each of the epistemic harms is such that it could be
prevented only by a group of scientists rather than by any individual member
of the given scientific community. While various scientific institutions act as
organized groups that aim at both forwarding epistemic goals and preventing
epistemic harms, the above cases illustrate problems that typically don’t fall
under the jurisdiction of an existing institution, but require a joint action of sci-
entists working in the given domain, where they are unorganized with respect
to the given issue. Different theories of collective moral responsibility have been
developed to account for moral duties of unorganized groups in such circum-
stances.2 The basic intuition they aim to address is that individuals should join
forces in order to prevent the given harm. But what if the given harm is such
that it has distinct epistemic features (e.g. in virtue of impeding our knowl-
edge acquisition)? What if, for instance, the scientists in Abandoned-research
are cosmologists, so that abandoning a fruitful hypothesis may have no major
social or ethical implications, though it may have epistemic ones? Similarly we
may ask: is the nature of the duties we associate with Biased primarily moral,
or also (and equally) epistemic?
In this paper we propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility
which provides the normative basis for answering these questions. Our approach
is inspired by Hindriks’ (2018) account of collective moral responsibility. It is
rooted in the idea that when a harm can only be prevented by group action,
this creates a specific duty for each individual in the group: namely, a duty to
join action in order to prevent the harm.
1This story is pretty much what happened during the twentieth century research on peptic
ulcer disease, see Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 2014b.
2We will provide an overview of these accounts in Section 2.
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Our account offers three significant novel contributions. First, it distin-
guishes between unorganized groups and what we call mobilized groups. This
helps motivate and justify two-part views like ours and Hindriks’. Second, we
will argue that collective epistemic responsibility has a distinct normative char-
acter. Thus, our account complements accounts of collective moral responsibil-
ity. Third, our approach fills an important gap in the literature on epistemic
responsibility since, unlike previously proposed accounts, it provides a norma-
tive framework for evaluating cases of epistemic harms that can be prevented
only by a collective action. This last point requires some clarification.
The literature on epistemic responsibility traditionally concerned appropri-
ate belief-formation (e.g., Code, 1987; Hieronymi, 2008; Kornblith, 1983; Miller
and Record, 2013; Robitzsch, 2019). In particular, it concerned whether subjects
acted appropriately in response to what evidence (or other epistemic resources,
like methods, processes, or virtues) they had available to them when forming be-
liefs. Subsequently, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have generally
concerned collective belief-formation and knowledge acquisition (e.g., Corlett,
2001, Rolin, 2008; Rolin, 2016, Millar, 2020). The theory we propose here is dis-
tinct from these traditional projects in two important ways. First, our project
concerns not belief-formation, but other kinds of epistemic performances and
activities. In particular, we focus on actions at earlier stages of inquiry than
belief-formation. Second, our focus is on norms that prevent a failure to meet
epistemic goals, which are cases of epistemic harm. As such, our account is pre-
ventionist in character. The main reason why traditional accounts of collective
epistemic responsibility need to be supplemented by a preventionist one is that
preventing a failure to achieve epistemic goals may require different norms than
those typically guiding belief-formation. In other words, a group of agents who
have engaged in responsible belief-formation (or knowledge acquisition) may
still fail to engage in the prevention of pending epistemic harms.
Our example Abandoned-research is a case in point: while scientists pursu-
ing H2 may hold an adequate epistemic attitude towards their hypothesis (e.g.
treating it as only one among many fruitful hypotheses), and even consider H1
worthy of pursuit, traditional accounts of epistemic responsibility do not address
the question: what kind of responsibility do these scientists have with respect
to the threat of an epistemic harm posed by the abandoning of H1? Similarly,
if we examine the case retrospectively, traditional accounts don’t tell us who (if
anyone) is to blame for the given abandonment and why.
Here is how we will proceed. In Section 2, we offer some background on
the notion of collective moral responsibility, and discuss the duty to join forces.
In Section 3 we introduce our account of collective epistemic responsibility and
show how it addresses the cases we began with. In Section 4 we explain how
our account is genuinely epistemic in character. In Section 5 we conclude the
paper by showing how our account fruitfully applies to some additional cases.
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2 Collective Moral Responsibility
Often, people talk as though groups have obligations, or are responsible for
things. We hold governments and corporations accountable for their actions.
Exxon-Mobil is responsible for various oil spills. BP is obligated to clean up the
Gulf of Mexico. This suggests that there are group obligations and responsibil-
ities. A common way to classify groups that bear such obligations is as follows.
The first are organized groups with explicitly specified structures and decision
procedures, like corporations and governments. The second are persistent but
unorganized social groups, e.g., races, genders, and nationalities. Finally, and
most controversially, there are random collectives (Held, 1970): groups of peo-
ple who are only connected by the relevance of some problem or task, e.g.,
passengers in train car 6745, or beachgoers in Asbury Park on July 23rd.
There is something puzzling about attributions of collective responsibil-
ity. Generally, we only hold moral agents responsible for their actions. So,
some philosophers have argued that organized groups like Exxon-Mobil and the
United States count as group agents. But this response is not particularly plau-
sible as an explanation for why persistent social groups bear responsibility, and
it is even less plausible as an explanation for attributions of responsibility to
random collectives. Yet there are a variety of cases where it is intuitively plau-
sible that even fleeting, unorganized groups do bear collective responsibility.
Many such cases involve collective action problems, what Hindriks calls “col-
lective harms” (Hindriks, 2018). In this section, we will discuss desiderata for
a theory explaining the intuitive appeal of assigning collective responsibility in
such cases.
There are two important distinctions to make when talking about responsi-
bility. First, there is a distinction between accountability and what we might
call positive responsibility (Williams, 2008). Sometimes, when we say an agent
is responsible, we mean that it is appropriate to hold them accountable for
something: it is appropriate to praise or blame them. The antonym of this
kind of responsibility is “not responsible.” On the other hand, sometimes we
say someone is responsible because they have met their obligations, and are
praiseworthy. The antonym for this positive responsibility is “irresponsible.”
Epistemologists, especially responsibilists, have been interested in both kinds
of responsibility (Baehr, 2011; Williams, 2008; Zagzebski, 1996). In this paper,
we will be concerned with responsibility as accountability. The second relevant
distinction concerns backward-looking responsibility, as associated with praise
and blame, and forward-looking responsibility, which is associated with obli-
gation and remediation (Smiley, 2017). However, our view, like many views
in the contemporary literature, will seek to apply coherently to both kinds of
responsibility. So, we will largely set the distinction aside in what follows.
2.1 Desiderata for a Theory of Collective Responsibility
Consider the following case (adapted from Bjo¨rnsson, forthcoming):
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Beach: A group of twelve children are swimming in the ocean. Three
of the children have brought a parent with them. Suddenly, the wind
changes and begins sweeping the children out to sea. Each adult only
has time to save one child by swimming. However, there is a boat
nearby that can be operated by two adults. With the boat, all the
children can be saved.3
Intuitively, the parents have an obligation to save all the children. The
only way to save them, however, requires a coordinated collective action. No
individual adult can save all the children. Only the coordinated action of two
adults together can operate the boat. Hence, the children being swept out to
sea is a collective harm: it can only be prevented by collective action. Moreover,
the parents do not form any kind of organized group; they may not even know
one another. The only connection between them is that they happen to be at
the beach at the relevant time. They are thus an unorganized group, what Held
calls a “random collective.” (1970, p. 475). Despite each individual parent’s
inability to save the children, and despite their lack of organization as a group,
it is still intuitive that parents are obligated to save all the children. This is an
instance of what we can call the primary intuition about collective responsibility
for unorganized groups.4 Of course, the structural similarity of this case with
the two cases we began with is no coincidence.
A theory of collective moral responsibility must explain the primary intu-
ition.5 However, this isn’t the only requirement for such a theory. Schwenken-
becher suggests a variety of desiderata for an account of collective responsibility
(2018, pp. 111-112). For one thing, a theory needs to explain additional in-
tuitions, e.g., that each individual has responsibilities in such cases, and that
their (other) individual responsibilities can sometimes come into conflict with
the group responsibilities. In Beach, the individual parents each have an obli-
gation to save their own children, and this might conceivably conflict with the
group’s duty to save all the children. At the same time, each parent also seems
to have an individual duty to contribute to the collective action solution. Call
these, and related intuitions, the secondary intuitions.
In addition to explaining intuitions, a theory of collective responsibility
should also cohere with accepted moral principles. Or at least, it speaks in
favor of such a theory if it does not propose ad hoc exceptions to these prin-
ciples. Hindriks’ helpfully identifies four relevant conditions on responsibility
which are commonly accepted principles of this sort (2018, p. 206):6
3Virginia Held contributed a variety of cases like this to the literature in her (1970) paper.
Her discussion there inspired much of the subsequent literature on collective responsibility for
unorganized groups. For another influential discussion, see Parfit (1984).
4We are following Bjornsson (forthcoming) and Schwenkenbecher (2018) here in emphasiz-
ing this.
5Some philosophers are skeptical of appeal to intuition. However, it is commonly accepted
in the ethics and epistemology literature that intuitions provide at least defeasible evidence
for a theory, and that they serve as part of the data to be explained by such theories. We will
follow that convention here.
6See Hindriks, 2018, p. 206 for a discussion on possible variation on each of the listed
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1. The agency condition: Only full moral agents can bear responsibility. A
full moral agent is normatively competent in the sense of being recep-
tive and responsive to epistemic reasons (thus conforming to Fischer and
Ravizza’s (1998) reason-responsive account of responsibility).
2. The causal condition: the agent is able to prevent the harm. In the
collective case, this might be in virtue of a joint action with other agents.7
3. The epistemic condition: the agent has a justified belief about the exis-
tence of the pending harm and the likelihood of the success of preventing
it (potentially by means of a collective effort), or she is in an epistemic
position such that she is able to have a justified belief about this.8
4. The no-defeaters condition: The agent does not have defeating evidence
that provides an excuse or a justification for not fulfilling the duty (for
example, evidence showing that preventing the given harm by a collective
effort is in conflict with another epistemic or moral duty).
As will become clear, explaining the primary intuition without violating these
principles is difficult. In particular, it is hard to explain the intuition in cases like
Beach, as there are no agents who satisfy both the agency and causal conditions.
The group is not an agent, while no individual parent can save all the children.
In addition to explaining the intuitions and cohering with commonly ac-
cepted moral principles, there are several other desiderata. Many philosophers
have thought that a theory of collective responsibility for unorganized groups
should be action-guiding. Moreover, accepting the theory and following its dic-
tates should lead to moral improvement. The thought is that a theory which
vindicates the moral responsibility of groups will enable us to argue that people
are required to take part in collective action solutions such as preventing climate
change. To this end, a theory should not only posit collective responsibility of
groups, it should explain how individuals’ responsibilities are to be derived from
(or at least related to) collective responsibility.
Finally, theories of collective responsibility should be evaluated in part based
on consideration of more generic explanatory virtues. A theory will thus be
better insofar as it is: more parsimonious, because it posits fewer new entities
or novel principles; has greater explanatory power, because it explains more of
the data in question; or it is more unified (i.e., consilient), because it provides
an explanation for evidence from diverse sources, or coheres well with other
explanations which do so. These desiderata were proposed for theories of moral
responsibility. However, we suggest that the same desiderata, suitably modified,
are relevant for evaluating theories of collective epistemic responsibility.
conditions. Schwenkenbecher identifies the same principles, though describes them somewhat
differently (2018).
7Schwenkenbecher calls this the capacity principle (2018, p. 111), while others have given
similar conditions in terms of ability (Pinkert, 2014; Wringe, 2019).
8Hindriks formulates this condition in terms of an agent knowing of the pending harm, but
adds that this may be a too strong requirement. The second disjunct points to the importance
of agents being epistemically responsible with respect to the formation of such beliefs.
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2.2 The Duty to Join Forces
There are two important choice points for a theory of collective responsibil-
ity. The first is reducibility. Reductive accounts explain away intuitions about
collective duties by reducing them to duties of individuals. Non-reductive ac-
counts suggest that collective responsibility is irreducibly ascribed to a collective
as such. The second choice point concerns how to deal with the agency con-
dition.9 Conservative theories attempt to accommodate the agency condition.
They seek to explain away the primary intuition by appeal to responsibilities of
either individual or group agents.10 Revisionist theorists, following Held (1970),
argue that being a full-fledged, reasons-responsive moral agent is not a require-
ment for bearing responsibility. Wringe (2016; 2019), for instance, takes the
primary intuition to be strong motivation, by itself, for discarding the agency
condition. Finally, joint (or shared) theories ascribe moral obligations and re-
sponsibilities only to individual agents. However, they suggest that the content
of those responsibilities is distinctively shared, as they call for irreducibly joint
actions.11
Each of these choices introduces problems for meeting the desiderata. Re-
duction requires denying the primary intuition, while anti-reduction requires
explaining who or what has the non-reducible responsibility. Conservatives of-
ten deny the primary intuition. Revisionists must deny the very plausible agency
condition. And joint/shared theorists must motivate a variety of novel explana-
tory machinery to vindicate the idea that responsibilities can be both aimed at
individuals and still genuinely shared.
Hindriks (2018) proposes the Duty to Join Forces theory as a hybrid of the
above approaches, which avoids their pitfalls while keeping their strengths. The
central idea of his account is that collective responsibility is explained as a duty
in two stages: first, as a duty to join forces, and second, a duty to prevent
the harm. Hindriks’ point of departure “is the claim that a random collective
has a duty to prevent an outcome only if enough of its members are ready
to suitably combine their preventive efforts. Furthermore, such a collective
often acquires this duty only after a sufficient number of members have been
mobilized.” (p. 205).
Thus, the view proposes two stages of responsibility that together comprise
the duty to join forces. The stages are:
1. Mobilize others
2. Collectively prevent the harm.
9Here, we are following the taxonomy of (Schwenkenbecher, 2019).
10Feinberg offers a conservative view that denies the primary intuition (1968). Other tra-
ditionalists are happy to talk about obligations of groups if they show appropriate cohesion.
This cohesion might be a matter of group organization which allows for group agency (List and
Pettit, 2011; Pettit and Schweikard, 2006; Tollefsen, 2015), or of solidarity or identification
(Darby and Branscombe, 2014; McGary, 1986).
11Joint views are proposed by, Bjo¨rnsson (2014), Miller (2015b), Pinkert (2014), and
Schwenkenbecher (2019), among others. Schwenkenbecher, for example, argues that joint
responsibilities exist when agents are required to “we-reason.” This requires each individual
to reason about what “we” should do, as a group.
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The first stage of mobilizing others consists in a responsibility of individu-
als. This is a responsibility of each member of the group to communicate with
the other group members and convince them to join the effort necessary for
preventing the harm. Hindriks calls this a lateral duty, as it requires not that
the agent prevent the harm (which is the ultimate goal), but that the agent
communicate and convince other members of the group. In addition, individual
group members have a responsibility to be receptive to others who attempt to
mobilize them. The first stage is successful if an adequate number of group
members have been suitably mobilized to join the collective effort.
The second stage is a conditional norm: it only occurs if the first is successful.
If this condition is satisfied, then, the collective as a whole has an obligation to
prevent the harm. The collective now has a duty to engage in the joint action
needed to avert the bad consequences.12
We can illustrate the duty to join forces by appeal to Beach. First, the
parents have a responsibility to mobilize: to come to agreement about what
they should do. In this case, each should communicate with the others about
the presence of the boat, and how they can work together to use the boat for
rescuing all the children. Once there is agreement among enough of them about
what course of action to take, they have successfully mobilized. This activates
the second stage: the mobilized group of parents now has a responsibility to
use the boat to save all the children. At the time they have an obligation
(forward-looking responsibility). If they fail to do so (through inaction, say)
they can be held accountable (backward responsible) for this failure. If both
stages are completed successfully, then the parents will have fulfilled their duty
to join forces, i.e., their collective duty. Thus, the account explains the primary
intuition as applied to this case.
The status of a random collective after enough people have been success-
fully mobilized to engage in collective action (other things being equal) is left
somewhat unclear by Hindriks’ discussion. Hindriks highlights the difference
in ontological status between group agents and groups that have joined forces.
However, we think there is also an important distinction between the random
collective before and after joining forces (Hindriks, 2018, p. 211). We will return
to this below.
Hindriks’ account fares well regarding the desiderata introduced above (sec-
tion 2.1). It explains the primary intuition. It also explains the secondary
intuitions regarding individual duties: individuals have duties to mobilize oth-
ers, and then to engage in the joint action required to prevent the harm. It
coheres well with the previously accepted moral principles, with the notable
exception of the agency condition, as we will discuss below (section 3.3). It is
parsimonious in that the only novel things it proposes are the collective obli-
gations which are needed to satisfy the primary intuition. It does not require
appeal to novel types of reasoning, or commitment to anything particular about
12Collins (2013) proposes an account of collective responsibility in terms of a duty to incor-
porate into a group agent. However, she admits that in cases like Beach it is implausible to
think that the collective needs to form an organized group like a corporation in order to save
the children.
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moral motivation (as do Schwenkbecher and Bjo¨rnsson, respectively). It does
not add anything ontologically substantial to suggest that individuals have obli-
gations to mobilize others, as individual responsibilities are commonly accepted,
and in any case are necessary to vindicate the secondary intuition.
3 Collective Epistemic Responsibility
In this section, we offer a theory of collective epistemic responsibility. Our
theory is a hybrid account inspired by Hindriks’ Duty to Join Forces.
3.1 The epistemic duty to join forces
We start from the idea that there are certain epistemic harms that can be
prevented only by a collective of individuals, rather than by any of its members
on their own. We will call such effects collective epistemic harms. Moreover,
such harms may occur in situations where there is no existing organized group
that could prevent it. As the examples at the beginning of this paper illustrate,
situations in which scientists working in a given domain may end up acquiring
knowledge inefficiently and accepting false hypotheses, where it would take more
than one individual to prevent such a harm, are not hard to imagine. Let’s
specify these notions:
Epistemic harm: a harm affecting the epistemic status of a subject, group of
subjects, or epistemically important social system.13
This characterization of epistemic harm is quite generic: it intentionally
leaves open the substance of an epistemic harm. This allows our account to be
neutral between a wide variety of different epistemological theories of epistemic
value, justification, scientific progress, etc. Our theory of collective epistemic
responsibility thereby applies to a wide range of epistemic views. For example,
an easy way to make the notion of epistemic harm concrete and substantive
is to adopt a veritistic, reliabilist account (Goldman, 1979a, 1986). On such
a view, a harm involves causing subjects to hold false beliefs, or undermining
the reliability of their individual or social methods of belief formation.14 Al-
ternatively, in providing a theory of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker offers
a pluralistic view which includes a variety of ways to be epistemically harmed
(Fricker, 2007).15
13For more on systems epistemology, see Goldman, 1999.
14There are a variety of competing views about the nature of epistemic value and the goals
of inquiry, any of which will be compatible with our account. The view one chooses will
help determine what counts as a harm due to impeding such goals. Besides truth, the goals
might be knowledge (Williamson, 2002), understanding (Elgin, 2017; Kvanvig, 2003), problem
solving (Laudan, 1977), etc. In any case, the goal of any inquiry likely needs to be constrained
by the question guiding that inquiry (Friedman, 2017; Hookway, 2008; Khalifa, forthcoming;
Millson and Khalifa, 2020), which will also constrain what can count as a harm.
15An epistemic injustice involves epistemic harms which are unjust, generally because of
oppressive social structures. For more on this and related ideas, see (Dotson, 2011; Fricker,
2007; Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, 2017; McKinnon, 2016; Medina, 2013).
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We are interested in a specific type of epistemic harm: the kind that can
only be prevented by group action. Thus:
Collective epistemic harm: an epistemic harm that can be prevented only
by a joint effort of several individual agents, rather than by any single
individual on their own.
The existence of such harms, as illustrated by our motivating cases from
section 1, shows the need for a theory of collective epistemic responsibility that
applies even to unorganized groups. Each of those cases elicits an intuitive judg-
ment analogous to the primary intuition in Beach. For instance, in Abandoned-
research, there is a collective epistemic harm that results from abandoning a
live hypothesis which turns out to be true. The intuition is that the collec-
tive, comprised of the scientists working in the relevant branch of medicine,
is responsible for negligently abandoning an important (and in this case true)
theory. Call this the primary epistemic intuition. There is also a secondary
intuition: that individual medical researchers who are members of the collective
bear their own, individual responsibilities for failing to contribute to a joint
solution to the collective epistemic harm. Moreover, there are other secondary
intuitions: for example, that individual scientists also bear individual responsi-
bilities towards their own respective inquiries, which may be incompatible with
the abandoned hypothesis, giving rise to possibly conflicting obligations.
The existence of collective epistemic harms, and the primary and secondary
epistemic intuitions, leaves social epistemology with a problem similar to that
of collective moral responsibility in ethics. This is one upshot of our discussion
worth highlighting, even for those who will disagree with our specific account:
there is a problem that requires a solution. The desiderata for solving this
problem, we suggest, are analogous to those discussed above in section 2.1.
In view of this we propose a theory of collective epistemic responsibility
based on a two stage duty:
Epistemic duty to join forces: an obligation of an unorganized group to
prevent a collective epistemic harm. It consists of the following sub-duties:
D1 a duty of individuals to approach other relevant agents raising aware-
ness about the epistemic harm, expressing willingness to prevent it,
and encouraging others to do the same;
D2 a duty of those who have fulfilled D1, and thereby formed a mobilized
group, to prevent the epistemic harm.
The epistemic duty to join forces (EDJF) is a two stage-view, just as in
Hindriks’ account of collective moral responsibility. It is a conditional norm: D2
is triggered when for a sufficient number of involved individuals D1 is successfully
fulfilled. The first stage is a responsibility of individual agents to mobilize
others. This requires communication and organization. If D1 is successful,
then the mobilized collective is responsible for preventing the harmful outcome,
first in prospective sense, meaning there is a collective epistemic duty to follow
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the norm, and subsequently in the retrospective sense, meaning the group is
epistemically praise- or blame-worthy.
Note that if there is an unorganized group in a position to prevent a collective
epistemic harm, but the members of the group fail to fulfill D1, then D2 is not
triggered. In this case, individual members of the group will be blameworthy
for failing to join forces (for failing D1). But since the collective has never been
adequately mobilized, the collective never obtained a duty to prevent the harm.
Thus, according to EDJF, duties to prevent collective harms remain conditional:
the collective duty only obtains once the individual duties to join forces have
been fulfilled. This has the benefit of ascribing duties in such cases only to moral
agents who fulfill the conditions of all four standard principles of responsibility
(described in section 2.1). Only at the second stage is their responsibility born
by the collective. If the collective is never suitably mobilized to prevent the
harm, i.e., there is no joining of forces (we will shortly give an example of
what that means in the context of our cases), then D2 simply never obtains.
Nonetheless, EDJF does predict that members of the collective bear epistemic
responsibility in such a case, and will thereby be epistemically blameworthy as
individuals for failing to fulfill D1. Moreover, the view suggests a sense in which
the unorganized collective is responsible: all of its members have a duty to join
forces. This helps to vindicate the intuition that there is blameworthy action
occurring in such a case. D1 is thus a reducible group responsibility. The sense
in which the group is responsible is reducible to the fact that its members are.16
A group which has successfully joined forces, and met its D1 duty, must be
importantly different in its structure than it was prior to mobilization. This new
structure will generally fall short of what is required for group agency. Still, the
reason why it seems plausible to attribute a duty to the group once it has been
mobilized is that it has some new kind of status. Otherwise, it would not help
to require that the first stage be completed before the truly collective duty can
be ascribed to the group.
We propose that groups which have completed their stage one duty to join
forces be called mobilized groups. Such groups have more organizational struc-
ture than a truly unorganized group. Moreover, they may have different mem-
bers than the initial group. For instance, if two of the three parents in Beach
succeed in joining forces (or two-three scientists in Abandoned-research), they
are now a mobilized group. They now have a second stage duty to save the chil-
dren (i.e. to prevent the abandonment of the given hypothesis). This mobilized
group has fewer members than the unorganized group.
Mobilized groups lack organizational structure or long-term persistence. Still,
it is plausible that they have adequate cohesion to warrant ascription of col-
lective responsibility. Compare these to ascriptions of moral responsibility to
persistent social groups. For instance, many have found it plausible that white
16Of course, this is compatible with some of the members having excuses. What is required
is that some significant subset of the group has such duties. What subset this is will depend
on what is required in order to avoid the epistemic harm, but it will need to be more than a
single individual.
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Americans owe reparations for slavery and racial oppression.17 Regardless of
whether collective responsibility obtains in this specific case, its plausibility
suggests that persistent social groups are potentially responsible for things, de-
spite lacking the kind of organizational structure required for group agency.
Similarly, we suggest that mobilized groups are potentially morally responsi-
ble, despite lacking full-blown agency. Recognition of mobilized groups, and
their status as having a moderate level of organization, is a novel aspect of our
account.
Recognition of mobilized groups allows EDJF to explain the primary intu-
ition, while meeting all four of the conditions on responsibility discussed above
(Section 2.1). We will return to this point below, after discussing how EDJF
handles our motivating cases.
3.2 Back to the examples
EDJF can be illustrated by appeal to the examples from section 1. We first
consider Abandoned-research as well as several variants of this example. This
will illustrate the nuanced predictions and evaluations that the epistemic duty to
join forces allows. It will also show how the account handles both the prospective
and retrospective kinds of responsibility.
In Abandoned-research a plausible and potentially true theory, H1, is dropped
from active research. The question is who, if anyone, can be considered blame-
worthy for the premature abandonment of the fruitful hypothesis? The origi-
nal version of Abandoned-research concerns retrospective responsibility: H1 has
been abandoned already, and the question is who is culpable. EDJF analyzes
this case by appeal to its two stages. In particular, D1 is active as a requirement
for the group. The research community has a duty to join forces in order to
prevent the epistemic harm from the lack of research on H1. The individual
members of the community had a duty to communicate with one another about
avoiding the harm ahead of time. This could have been accomplished by an
agreement regarding this particular theory, in the form of individuals volunteer-
ing to rescue H1 and pursue it. Or it could take the form of a more general
solution, e.g., setting up a special research fund to ensure that such theories are
generally rescued. Either option would require communication and agreement
on some reformulation of the organization of the medical research community.
Since researchers in the community failed to engage in this communication, or
make any attempt to get others to join forces, the community has failed to fulfill
D1. It is retrospectively responsible for this failure.
Consider a variant of the case:
Abandoning : This case is precisely like Abandoned-research, except
that instead of ten years later, we consider the situation just before
H1 is abandoned. It is apparent that this abandonment will occur
17For an overview of literature on this topic, see(Boxill, 2016). For a discussion particularly
relevant to our claims about cohesion, see (McGary, 1986).
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soon, as H1’s main proponents are retiring and no one intends to
step up to take their place.
In Abandoning, EDJF suggests that there is a prospective responsibility of
type D1: the research community is obligated to communicate about how to save
H1. Each member is required to approach others and attempt to convince them
that H1 should be rescued. Moreover, each is responsible for being receptive
to such entreaties. Epistemic responsibility requires trying to recruit others,
and being willing to be recruited. If they fail in this duty, the situation will
end up precisely as it does in Abandoned-research. The community will be
(retrospectively) responsible for its failure to join forces, in virtue of its members’
failure. However, if the community in Abandoning fulfills its obligation to join
forces, it will thereby obtain a D2 obligation: to prevent the abandonment of
H1. This suggests two more variants to the case:
Rescued : This case is just like Abandoning, but the community has in
fact succeeded at joining forces. There is widespread communication
and agreement that H1 must be saved. The community agrees that
certain members will be assigned to pursue it, they do, and the
community arrives at the truth much more quickly.
Failed rescue: This case also proceeds just like Abandoning, and here
the community also succeeds at joining forces, achieving widespread
agreement that H1 must be saved. However, after this agreement is
reached, the community spends too long deliberating about which
researchers, in particular, should pursue the theory. Research is
stalled, and H1 is effectively abandoned anyway.
In Rescued, EDJF is completely fulfilled. The community successfully fulfills
its D1 obligation to join forces and mobilizes, thereby obtaining a D2 obligation
to prevent the collective epistemic harm of abandoning H1. Finally, D2 obliga-
tion is fulfilled when members of the community agree to take on responsibility
to pursue the theory. This illustrates successful fulfillment of prospective respon-
sibility. Moreover, this version of the community subsequently is responsible for
preventing the harm, and is thereby praiseworthy.18
Failed rescue, however, illustrates a community which fulfills D1, but still
fails to meet its collective obligation. In this case, the EDJF suggests that the
community has failed a collective duty. It is genuinely collectively responsible
for failing to prevent the harm (the abandonment of H1). It is culpable, qua
group, for this failure.19
18Note that according to our account the conditions for triggering EDJF are independent of
whether the given hypothesis is actually true or not. Even if H1 was rescued but turned out to
be false after all, triggering EDJF was warranted as long as H1 appeared worthy of pursuit so
that abandoning it indicated a threat of an epistemic harm (for discussions on such situations
see Fleisher, 2018; Sˇesˇelja, Kosolosky, and Straßer, 2012; Sˇesˇelja and Straßer, 2014a).
19Of course, a group might have an excuse a failure to fulfill D2, in which case they will
not be culpable for the failure. Failed rescue makes it explicit that it was inappropriate
deliberation that leads to the failure, which suggests no such excuse, and furthermore we can
assume there is no other excuse available.
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These variant cases show the flexibility of EDJF in applying to a variety
of situations. Moreover, they show that the theory provides us with a way of
diagnosing normatively relevant differences between circumstances. The group
in Failed rescue does seem to have done better than the one in the original
version of Abandoned-research: it has at least recognized the problem and joined
collective forces with the aim of solving it. It just fails this final step. At the
same time, the Failed rescue group has a duty that the original group lacks.
This makes sense, since they have obtained an ability the original group lacks:
the ability to prevent the harm. A disorganized collective is not able to solve
such a problem, while a mobilized collective is. This allows the view to prescribe
duties only to entities that have the capability of fulfilling them, as required by
the causal condition. This last point helpfully motivates the discussion in the
next section. There, we will consider how EDJF, and its handling of the cases
at issue, fares with respect to the desiderata raised above in section 2.1.
EDJF’s handling of our second case, Biased, functions in the same way, so
a brief sketch should suffice. Recall that this case concerns a random collective
comprised of scientists in a research field with biased methodology. Continu-
ing with this biased methodology represents a collective epistemic harm: it is
harmful because it impedes scientific discovery, and can only be prevented by
collective action. The question here is whether such a group bears a collective
epistemic responsibility to change this standard. EDJF suggests that this group,
too, has an epistemic duty to join forces. Prospectively, it has a D1 reducible
duty, as each scientist will have a duty to communicate about the problem and
be receptive to joining a collective effort to solve it. If enough of the commu-
nity agrees to change, the newly mobilized collective will thereby incur a D2
obligation to change the methodological practices of the field. If they fail their
D2 obligation, the collective will be retrospectively responsible for this failure
(unless they have some excuse). Moreover, if the group fails to join forces, fails
to meet their D1 obligations, then the group will be retrospectively responsible
for failing to join forces, in virtue of the responsibility of the individual scientists
for failing to do so.
3.3 Desiderata Revisited
How does EDJF, and its proposed analysis of the cases, stack up regarding
the desiderata for an account of collective responsibility? In this section, we
evaluate the theory in light of these goals, before moving on to argue in Section
4 that the responsibility we have identified deserves to be called “epistemic.”
Primary and secondary intuitions. First, let’s consider the primary intu-
ition as it applies to our instigating cases. In Abandoned-research, the primary
intuition is that the random collective comprised of researchers in a medical
field had a collective responsibility to prevent the abandonment of hypothesis
H1. The variant cases considered in the last section showed that there is both
a prospective and retrospective version of this intuition. EDJF explains this
intuition in each case. The collective has an epistemic duty to join forces. If
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they fail to do so, they retrospectively bear responsibility for failing to fulfill this
duty. This failure can come at either stage. The community would also bear
responsibility (and be praiseworthy) if they had tried and succeeded in joining
forces to prevent the abandonment. EDJF has a disjunctive strategy for ex-
plaining the intuition. Either the responsibility of the group is reducible to the
individuals’ responsibility to join forces (D1); or the responsibility is irreducible
and applies directly to the newly organized collective (D2). According to either
option, EDJF licenses the judgment of collective responsibility that constitutes
the primary intuition.
Next, we consider secondary intuitions. We noted above two important
secondary intuitions for a theory to address. First, that individuals also have
responsibilities to contribute to preventing collective harms. Second, that other
individual responsibilities can come into conflict with the group responsibili-
ties. The epistemic duty to join forces offers explanations for both of these
secondary intuitions. According to EDJF, individuals have D1 responsibilities
to communicate with others, attempt to enlist them in a coordinated effort,
and to be receptive to others attempts to do the same. These are individual re-
sponsibilities to contribute to the collective action solution. At the same time,
individuals may have other obligations. For instance, in Abandoned-research,
a researcher may have a responsibility to continue work on H2 in light of the
funding they have received, or because their lab is best positioned to test that
hypothesis. This is a conflicting responsibility, because it at least suggests that
the researcher should continue such work at the expense of spending time en-
listing others to save H2. This is structurally similar to the conflicting moral
responsibility in Beach, where the parents responsibility to their own children
conflicts with the responsibility to join forces to save the group. Which obliga-
tion is the more important for an individual to follow will depend on the details
of the case. But any plausible theory will need to allow for such a conflict, and
EDJF does so.
Coherence with the principles of assigning responsibility. We now turn
to the harmony of EDJF with existing principles of responsibility. The primary
ones at issue are the four conditions (on both retrospective and prospective
responsibility) from section 2.1: the agency, causal, epistemic, and no-defeaters
conditions. We have previously seen their motivation in the context of moral
accounts of responsibility. Here we will start by assuming that prima facie they
also hold in the context of epistemic harms and epistemic responsibility. Since
the final three of the above conditions are reasonably straightforward for EDJF,
we treat these first. The agency condition is more complicated, and we consider
it last.
The no-defeaters condition requires no modification or special consideration
as applied to collective epistemic responsibility. EDJF is perfectly compatible
with a recognition that an agent (or group of agents) may have other reasons,
or excuses, for not preventing a harm. Both the D1 and D2 obligations are com-
patible with this recognition, and are potentially defeasible by other epistemic
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or moral considerations.
The causal condition (also called the ability or capacity condition) requires
that an agent bears a responsibility to φ only if they are able to φ. That
is, the agent must have causal efficacy with respect to what they are required
to do.20 In EDJF’s analysis of Abandoned-research, the causal condition was
fulfilled for D1, since each individual scientist is plausibly able to communicate
about joining forces (by email, in conferences and publications, etc.), and able to
signal willingness to join forces when others initiate such communication. The
condition is also fulfilled for D2, since upon joining forces the scientists would
have been able to prevent the abandonment of H1 by agreeing to an adequate
division of labor in the community.21 Thus, EDJF fits well with this accepted
principle, requiring that the causal condition be met in cases of responsibility.
The next one is the epistemic condition. Recall that this condition requires
that to be responsible for preventing some harm, an agent must know (or be
in a position to know) about the existence of the pending harm (or the risk
of such a harm occurring).22 Moreover, they must know of some reasonably
probable way of preventing it. Some views have suggested justified belief in
place of knowledge, but either way, justified belief would seem to be required.
The epistemic condition may initially seem worrisome: one might wonder
whether there is potential circularity in applying an epistemic condition to an
account of epistemic responsibility. In other words, the worry is that epistemic
responsibility is required for justified belief (and knowledge), while justified
belief is required for epistemic responsibility. However, this worry is easily
dispelled by recognizing the difference between the notion of epistemic respon-
sibility associated with responsible belief formation and belief holding (Code,
1987; Hieronymi, 2008; Kornblith, 1983; Montmarquet, 1993; Robitzsch, 2019;
Rolin, 2008; Williams, 2001; Zagzebski, 1996) and the notion associated with
the prevention of epistemic harms, which we are concerned with. If the epis-
temic condition requires a responsibly formed belief (a controversial claim), this
means a positively responsible belief: one that is formed in a way appropriately
responsive to evidence, and where evidence is gathered properly, etc. This is
a separate kind of responsibility than described by EDJF, which is an account
of preventionist responsibility. However, even if it turned out that the being
positively responsible requires being responsible in a preventionist way, there is
no special problem for our account. Being responsible (or justified) in believing
one proposition often involves a prior requirement of responsibility (or justifi-
cation) in another proposition. Any problems this causes (e.g., the traditional
regress of justification problem) are in no way specific to our account.
With the above ground-clearing done, it should be easy to see how EDJF
20This causal efficacy need not require that the agent be able to φ at will. The ability to φ
reliably enough when one tries is adequate in most cases.
21Implementation of this plan would include, for instance, mentioning all the promising
hypotheses in the articles and textbooks, encouraging others to embark onto less pursued
paths, etc.
22For instance, in Abandoned-research it is enough if the scientists know there is a substantial
risk of an epistemic harm happening, rather than a full certainty that it will happen.
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can cohere with the established principle. According to EDJF, D1 obligations
require individual agents to be in a position to know about the pending collective
epistemic harm, and potential steps to a solution. In Abandoned-research and
its variants, this means being positioned to know about the pending harm of
abandoning H1, and having some idea of how to begin to solve the problem.
23
D2 obligations also require that the group be in a position to know about the
harm. But for D2 responsibilities to be operative, the D1 responsibility to
communicate must already have been fulfilled. This makes it plausible that
a group that has joined forces will have a group belief about this in a very
straightforward sense: all the members who have joined together will know
about the harm and potential solution since they will have talked about it.
Thus, the epistemic condition is a reasonable requirement for both stages of
EDJF, and the theory is thereby compatible with the established principle.
The situation with the agency condition is more complicated. The agency
condition requires that only full moral agents—or for our purposes, intentional
epistemic agents24—those that are normatively competent, can be the bearers of
(epistemic) responsibilities and obligations. This principle has traditionally been
the sticking point for theories of collective moral responsibility. It is plausible
that organized groups, like corporations, have the requisite decision-making
structure and sensitivity to reasons required for counting as full moral agents.
However, ex hypothesi unorganized groups do not constitute group agents.
Advocates of the idea that random collectives can be morally responsible for
preventing collective harms have argued that the agency condition is false, at
least as it is traditionally understood. Wringe (2019), for instance, takes the
primary intuition to be powerful evidence that unorganized groups can bear
responsibility. He argues that this by itself shows the falsity of the agency
condition, and suggests instead that any entity capable of preventing a harm
meets whatever conditions are necessary for responsibility. Hindriks (2018)
argues that the agency condition is too restrictive. It was intended to rule out
holding animals, small children, and other non-competent agents as responsible.
It was never meant to apply to the collective cases. He opts for a revised version
which allows that either full moral agents or groups made up of such can bear
responsibility. Analogously, we could allow that either intentional epistemic
agents or groups made up of such bear epistemic responsibility. If either Wringe
or Hindriks’ arguments are compelling, EDJF is thereby made harmonious with
the resulting set of principles.
It is worth noting, however, that the original, restricted agency condition
is even less plausible in the epistemic case than the moral one. The notion of
collective epistemic agency is no novelty in the philosophical literature. For ex-
ample, according to Tollefsen (2004) groups can be epistemic agents if they are
23The latter requirement is less stringent than it may seem. All that is required is that the
first steps toward a solution are knowable. This could be fulfilled even by knowing that one
can form a committee to explore potential solutions.
24Intentional epistemic agent is the one “whose wants or desires cause (at least in some
significantly contributory sense) its belief formation in regards to p at tn.” (Corlett, 2007,
p. 238).
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engaged in a joint rational deliberation. Moreover, collective agency has been
emphasized as particularly relevant in the context of scientific inquiry (e.g. Fa-
gan, 2012; Fagan, 2014; Gilbert, 2000; Miller, 2015a; Rolin, 2008; Wray, 2007).
In view of this, assigning the norm of epistemic responsibility to an unorganized
collective of epistemic agents, capable of preventing a pending epistemic harm,
should not be controversial.25
Furthermore, although the strict version of the agency condition must be
denied by the proponent of EDJF, our account does not entail that collectives
with no organization whatsoever can be the bearers of irreducible responsibil-
ity. EDJF’s D1 responsibilities are reducible: the unorganized group only has a
collective responsibility derivatively, in virtue of each group member’s individ-
ual duty to communicate and enlist others. Meanwhile, the D2 responsibilities
are only active once a suitable number of group members have joined forces and
formed a mobilized group. As discussed, mobilized groups have a distinct status
from the previously unorganized group. However, mobilization does not rise to
the level of group agency.26 Note that this is also why our theory is plausible in
cases like Abandoned-research. The group of members who have newly joined
forces need not have the kind of general sensitivity or lasting organization re-
quired for agency. Nonetheless, this mobilization is clearly a distinct level of
organization from the initial random collective. Thus, the irreducibly collective
responsibility of D2 is born by a group that is not entirely unorganized. The
(D2) duty to save hypothesis H1 is an obligation not of scientists who just hap-
pen to be in the field; rather, it is a duty of a mobilized group whose members
have agreed to join forces.
Theoretical virtues. The final set of desiderata we need to consider are the-
oretical virtues commonly associated with normative epistemological accounts.
Let’s start from parsimony. The epistemic duty to join forces does require two
kinds of duties to explain the relevant cases. One of these is irreducibly col-
lective: D2 duties are duties of the group to prevent the harm, and cannot be
reduced to individual duties. These two features do make the view less simple.
Still, the theory only requires kinds of responsibilities that we have independent
reason to admit. D1 duties look like ordinary obligations of individuals, and
are not particularly exotic. The D2 obligations are similar to the kind that
have been suggested independently for other kinds of organized groups such
as corporations and research labs. As we have noted, the duty is also similar
to views about collective responsibility of persistent social groups. Moreover,
EDJF avoids any need for appeal to entirely new kinds of reasoning structures,
25Social and feminist epistemologists have long recognized the importance to epistemology
of evaluating non-agents. Feminist philosophers such as Longino (2002; 1990) and Solomon
(2001) have argued that we must evaluate the social structure of scientific fields prior to
evaluating any individual subject’s justification for accepting scientific theories. Social epis-
temologists like Goldman (1999), Kitcher (1990), and Strevens (2003) have highlighted the
importance of evaluating scientific systems and institutions. Thus, there is significant estab-
lished precedent for epistemic evaluations of non-agents.
26This distinguishes the current view from an epistemic analog of Collins’ “duty to incor-
porate”, which requires a higher degree of group organization (2013).
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and to irreducible obligations to completely unorganized groups (as is required
for joint/shared views such as Schwenkenbecher’s (2018)). Given the view’s ex-
planatory power in a range of cases, as illustrated above, any loss of parsimony
seems minimal.
The epistemic duty to join forces meets the main desiderata of a theory of
collective responsibility. The only real concern is the agency condition, and
there is reason to doubt that condition in its original form.
4 Epistemic Character of EDJF
So far, we have presented cases which intuitively support the contention that
there is a kind of responsibility which applies to unorganized groups in scientific
contexts. We then offered a theory which accounts for this kind of collective
responsibility, inspired by one from the moral domain. Moreover, we have ar-
gued that this account meets the accepted desiderata for a theory of collective
responsibility. However, even if all of this is convincing, one significant issue
remains unaddressed: why think the duty is genuinely epistemic? Why do we
need a separate notion of collective epistemic responsibility to go along with the
more general moral notion? Moreover, past accounts of epistemic responsibility
have focused on doxastic responsibility, i.e., subjects’ responsibility for their be-
liefs. Most have been concerned with using the notion of positive responsibility
to explain epistemic justification.27 The kind of responsibility highlighted in
this paper seems different. So why think it is epistemic?
4.1 EDJF and epistemic aims
Our first argument for the genuinely epistemic character of EDJF concerns
the aims28 underlying this kind of responsibility. Recall our initial examples.
Abandoned–research and Biased are cases where, intuitively, the unorganized
group in question is responsible for failing to prevent an epistemic harm. In
both cases, scientific inquiry has been (or will be) impeded. The harm to be
prevented is epistemic insofar as it is a harm to inquiry, to the pursuit of scientific
knowledge or progress.29 For this reason, the obligations in these cases are
obligations to prevent epistemic harms.
27See, for example Code (1987), Hieronymi (2008), Kornblith (1983), Montmarquet (1993),
Rolin (2008), Williams (2001), and Zagzebski (1996). Miller (2015) recognizes the importance
of collective epistemic action. However, he argues that the kind of responsibility one has for
epistemic actions is in fact ordinary moral responsibility.
28For a discussion on different characterizations of epistemic normativity see Robitzsch
(2019), Chapter 3.3. Also see fn. 14.
29There is an enormous variety of accounts of scientific progress. The goal of science might
be the accumulation of true beliefs, knowledge, explanations (Goldman, 1999). The goal
might be to increase problem solving power (Kuhn, 1962; Laudan, 1977), or it might merely
be pursuit of useful tools for prediction (Duhem, 1954), or the development of theories offering
empirically adequate generalizations (Fraassen, 1980). For an overview of this literature, see
Chakravartty (2017). Our theory of epistemic responsibility is neutral about which of these
is the proper account of the goals of science. However, whatever the goal is, it seems fair to
label it epistemic: science is a paradigmatic example of epistemic activity.
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Moreover, the practice of holding the groups responsible in these cases also
functions to promote epistemic ends. Preventing collective epistemic harms is
epistemically beneficial generally. So, the general practice of holding groups
accountable for failures to do so is itself aimed at epistemic ends. What is more,
EDJF allows for the assignment of epistemic blame and praise in contexts in-
cluding collective epistemic harms. In particular, our account provides both the
duties in view of which epistemic blame and praise can be assigned to the rele-
vant individuals, as well as conditions which have to be fulfilled for such duties
to be triggered. For example, in Abandoned-research we can hold the individ-
uals comprising the given scientific community as blame-worthy (assuming the
epistemic, causal and no-defeaters conditions were satisfied).
Altogether, the epistemic character of the aims of EDJF goes a long way
toward establishing that it describes a kind of epistemic responsibility. If one
is satisfied by this, then nothing further is required to establish its epistemic
nature.
However, some might still worry that having epistemic aims is not enough.
There may be cases where an agent has an obligation to promote epistemic ends,
but where this obligation is not itself epistemic. For instance, an obligation to
avoid dishonesty promotes epistemic ends, but it might count as a purely moral
obligation.
This thought, that epistemic aims are not enough to establish that a duty
is epistemic, may be motivated by a background picture that ties epistemic
obligations, duties, and reasons exclusively to belief and evidence. On this
view, epistemic reasons just are reasons to believe a particular proposition is
true. For a duty or obligation to count as epistemic, it must be a duty to
respond to evidence with an appropriate belief state. (Feldman, 2002, Shah,
2006; Shah and Velleman, 2005). Such a view might admit that true beliefs are
epistemic goods, while denying that one has an epistemic obligation, or even an
epistemic reason, to pursue a greater number of true beliefs. Moreover, and more
importantly for our purposes, reasons for action simply cannot be epistemic
reasons, by definition. For similar reasons, obligations and responsibilities to
promote epistemic ends by acting in various ways will also fail to be epistemic.
The kind of restricted view of epistemic normativity just sketched should
be resisted. It excludes from the purview of epistemic evaluation, and episte-
mology, the greater portion of our epistemic pursuits. Inquiry, most especially
scientific inquiry, is a paradigmatic example of epistemic activity. The evalua-
tion of inquiry requires more than obligations to respect evidence.30 To treat
the norms of proper inquiry as a matter only of moral or pragmatic interest is
to ignore important epistemic concerns. Moreover, the norms of proper inquiry
can come apart from obligations to respect evidence for a particular theory. A
scientist might have good reason to work on a theory based on its potential
fruitfulness, despite having strong evidence against it. Abandoned-research is
30See Robitzsch, 2019 for an encompassing discussion on this issue. Robitzsch proposes a
rule-consequentialist account of ‘intellectual norms’ as epistemic norms, which have belief-
influencing actions and omissions as their objects, and which are such that they guide the
exercise of indirect doxastic control and govern doxastic responsibility assessments.
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meant to illustrate just this kind of case.31 Thus, some epistemic obligations
and responsibilities will go beyond responsibilities to believe according to one’s
evidence. This is compatible with thinking there is something special about
reasons to believe a proposition is true. But they are not the only kinds of
epistemic considerations.32
4.2 EDJF and epistemic practice
The above response to the worry that EDJF is not epistemic still leaves us
with the question of how to distinguish practical and moral considerations from
those in our now expanded notion of the epistemic. What else, beyond an
epistemic aim, is needed to make a responsibility epistemic? We suggest that
one way to specify such responsibilities is as those that are embedded in a
historical epistemic practice. In the cases at issue, the obligations that are
intuitively present, and which are described by EDJF, exist partially in virtue
of the scientific practice the researchers are engaging in. If the individuals in
Abandoned-research were not members of their research community, engaged in
the practice of medical research, they would bear no responsibility for ensuring
that H1 is pursued. Their obligations in this case are derived from their more
general commitments as scientists in this field and community. By joining the
scientific community, one displays what Kutz calls a ‘participatory intention’:
“an intention to do my part of a collective act, where my part is defined as the
task I ought to perform if we are to be successful in realizing a shared goal.”
(Kutz, 2000, p. 10). Thus, the engagement of the scientists in our example with
the practice of medical research grounds our ability to normatively assess them
from the standpoint of epistemic responsibility.
The basic idea is that scientists are engaged in a practice of inquiry.33 A
practice is an area of human activity with a particular set of aims, norms, and
traditions. The norms of a practice are internal to that practice: a practitioner’s
performance can be evaluated according to these norms in a way that is indepen-
dent of other forms of evaluation. Examples of practices are things like chess,
basketball, and archery. These help illustrate the independence of evaluation:
One can be an excellent archer while being terribly impolite, or morally bad.
A chess move can be excellent according to the norms of chess, but morally
repugnant because it is meant to embarrass a clearly outmatched opponent.
31This point has long been accepted in the philosophy of science and social epistemology.
The historicist literature about theory change and pursuitworthiness in philosophy of science
focuses on these facets of epistemic normativity, as do the social epistemologists concerned
with social structure and distribution of labor. For an overview of historicism, see Nickles
(2017). For discussion of the social epistemology, see Goldman (1999). As we will mention
below, the literature on epistemic injustice, especially non-testimonial injustice, also shows a
sensitivity to this (McKinnon, 2016).
32See Steel (2010), Sosa (2019), and Fleisher (2018) for accounts distinguishing different
kinds of epistemic considerations. For other projects which expand the scope of epistemic
evaluation, see Singer and Aronowitz (forthcoming) and Friedman (forthcoming).
33The notion of practice we are appealing to here is inspired by the theories of MacIntyre
(1983), Sosa (2015), Longino (1990), and Solomon (2001).
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Fields of inquiry can be understood as practices in this sense. The scientists
in Abandoned-research are taking part in a particular practice of inquiry, one
which has its own aims, norms, and traditions. The tradition and aims help
determine the norms and standards by which research activity within the field
is evaluated. These norms and standards govern when performances made in
the practice count as legitimate or appropriate ways of pursuing the goals of
the practice. Whether or not an individual or a group has an obligation in a
particular case will therefore depend on those norms and standards of their field
of inquiry. In Abandoned-research, the medical researchers have an obligation
to continue work on H1. Failing to do so will mean failing to abide by the
norms of the field regarding how the field’s aim is pursued. These norms are
epistemic norms, because the practice they are embedded in is an epistemic one,
which pursues epistemic goals. This thereby provides another reason to think
the obligations here are epistemic.
4.3 Epistemic responsibility
The preceding discussion suggests the following picture of what is sufficient for
something to count as an epistemic responsibility:
Epistemic Responsibility: A responsibility R is epistemic if:
1. it functions to promote an epistemic aim, and
2. it takes places in the context of an epistemic practice, and is thereby
appropriately evaluable by the epistemic standards of that practice.34
This sufficient condition clearly makes the epistemic duty to join forces an
account of epistemic responsibility. The resulting picture actually makes EDJF
fit better with previous accounts of epistemic responsibility than one might have
expected.
As we noted above, most theories of epistemic responsibility have been con-
cerned with doxastic responsibility, generally in the pursuit of a theory of dox-
astic justification. In addition, social epistemologists have developed accounts
of collective epistemic responsibility addressing the question: under what con-
ditions does a group of agents responsibly form and hold a given knowledge
claim (e.g. Corlett, 2001; Rolin, 2008; Rolin, 2016). We can dub both types of
previous approaches positive accounts of epistemic responsibility.
In contrast, the question addressed in this paper belongs to what we call
preventionist accounts of epistemic responsibility. While in some cases norms
proposed by the two accounts may overlap,35 in a number of others previous
34The practice of a particular scientific field, as described above, is one kind of epistemic
practice. But plausibly there are other more general kinds of epistemic practices, e.g., the
practice of giving and receiving testimony, which may be developed through either biological
or cultural evolution. This point is important for applications of EDJF outside of scientific
inquiry. Note also that this condition requires that the responsibility in question promotes an
epistemic aim. This rules out responsibilities, and practices, which promote goals or aims of
ignorance or epistemic injustice.
35For example, we could use Rolin’s account of collective epistemic responsibility to argue
that in order to avoid the harm of reaching a consensus on a false claim, the given scientific
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accounts won’t be up to the task. The reason for this is that the cases motivat-
ing our approach concern situations where no specific knowledge claim may be
irresponsibly held, but where an epistemic harm may nonetheless occur.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that both positive and preventionist accounts
of collective epistemic responsibility are, generally speaking, compatible with
theories of strictly doxastic responsibility. The latter are generally concerned
with belief-formation, and hold that we are generally directly responsible for
what we do, and only indirectly responsible for states of affairs. Since beliefs
are states, while belief-formations are actions, traditional responsibilist theories
of epistemic justification (and epistemic virtue) also concern responsibilities for
actions. The primary difference between such accounts and those addressing
collective epistemic responsibility is that the standards of belief formation an
agent is responsible for following are more constrained. That is, responsibly
formed beliefs really should only be sensitive to considerations about whether
the proposition in question is true.36
5 Outlook and conclusion
We have argued that there are cases of collective epistemic harm, which seem
to involve collective responsibility. We then offered an account of collective
epistemic responsibility, the epistemic duty to join forces, which explained how
to make sense of this kind of responsibility. As such, our account is a ‘preven-
tionist’ one, complementing previously proposed ‘positive’ accounts of collective
epistemic responsibility.
We conclude the paper by highlighting the significance of our account for
discussions on both collective epistemic and collective moral harms. First, the
success of EDJF, provides support for the fruitfulness of the moral duty to join
forces as a theory of collective responsibility and it supplements it in relevant
ways. For instance, our notion of a mobilized group may be helpful in the
analysis of moral harms in addition to the epistemic ones. Furthermore, the
EDJF offers a successful account of epistemic responsibility that also appeals
to a weakened agency condition, which suggests that this revision is generally
appropriate.
Second, EDJF sheds light on the importance of studying the process of mo-
bilization, which has so far been neglected by philosophers of science, but which
may be necessary for the prevention of certain epistemic harms. In particu-
lar, socio-epistemic conditions which could incentivize individuals to mobilize
and thereby prevent a given epistemic harm, have been largely unexplored and
deserve more attention.
community should be jointly committed to defend their claims in case they are appropriately
challenged (see Rolin, 2008, p. 121). This seems similar to the duties imposed by EDJF.
36Many have argued that beliefs should only be sensitive to truth (Goldman, 1979b, 1999),
accuracy (Joyce, 1998, 2009; Pettigrew, 2016), or evidence (Shah, 2006; Shah and Velleman,
2005). For defense of the idea that belief-formation should not be rationally sensitive to
considerations of long-run inquiry, see Berker (2013a,b), Firth (1981), Greaves (2013), and
Jenkins (2007).
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Finally, our account can be useful in the analysis of some additional cases,
beyond the context of scientific research. For instance, EDJF offers a helpful
supplement to theories of epistemic injustice37 since some cases of epistemic
injustice will count as collective epistemic harms. For example, hermenuetical
injustices that result from lack of conceptual resources (e.g. the lack of the con-
cept ‘sexual harassment’ prior to its introduction in the 1970s) are collective
epistemic harms: they harm individuals in their capacity to know, and they
are only preventable by collective action. Similarly, our account can help in
addressing epistemic duties arising from the threat of ‘fake news’ typical for
epistemically pernicious groups, such as epistemic bubbles and echo chambers
(Boyd, 2019). While positive accounts of epistemic responsibility provide guide-
lines for how to recognize one may be involved in an epistemically pernicious
group (e.g. by evaluating the degree to which the given group has been criti-
cal, open-minded and self-reflective, Corlett, 2001), our account specifies which
epistemic duties one has upon recognizing such an involvement.
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